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THE DEVOLUTION OF IMPLEMENTING POLICYMAKING
IN NETWORK GOVERNMENTS
Charles H. Koch, Jr.*

An undeniable, but often lamented, reality of modem government is that
substantial policymaking must take place at the implementation stage.
Legislative and executive authorities simply cannot resolve all policy issues,
and they often find it politically inadvisable to do so. The danger, of course, is
that efficiency or expediency will overwhelm the legitimate allocation of
responsibility between the political authorities and the administrative
authorities.
The balance between democratic legitimacy and effective
government thus dictates the delegation of the implementing authority. The
more complex the society and the more complicated the demands on
government, the more elusive this balance becomes.
Legal principles regulating delegations of authority suggest that authority
should be delegated based on hierarchy. Yet even in hierarchical systems,
influence moves not only up and down but also horizontally among the
decisionmakers and institutions within the system. Moreover, policy is made
at the lower levels of the hierarchy without the participation of the hierarchy's
upper reaches. Regardless, not all governments, especially supranational ones,
can be understood as mere hierarchies. Instead, the realities of governmental
policymaking are complicated by questions of legitimacy.
Even more complexity is added when several governmental systems
combine in some sort of federal organization. Recently, there has been a
strong movement toward such organizations. Regions and ethnic groups in
established nations and emerging nations alike are insisting on more autonomy.
Nations are coming together to form a variety of supranational organizations,
some quite broad in their mandates. These coordinated governments raise
increasingly complex implementation and devolution issues. Traditional
federal systems, such as the United States, have allocated shared authority
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through a divided federalism in which central and subunit administrative
hierarchies are formally segregated and their respective powers are more or
less clearly defined. 1
In contrast to this traditional federal organizational concept, the European
Union (E.U.) is built around commingled responsibilities. 2 From the
beginning, the member states have been integrally involved in the
policymaking from the foundational legislation to implementation. 3 Their
engagement has only increased over the years, as E.U. institutions tend to give
the member states implementing discretion through framework measures and
4
"soft" laws.
For these reasons, the E.U. system is most accurately
characterized as a network, comprised of webs of interrelationships among
E.U., national, and non-governmental institutions. Walter van Gerven
observed, "While public authority was traditionally organized pyramidally
along hierarchical lines, it is now also organized through numerous networks
of public and private nuclei of power, making power move both vertically and
horizontally." 5 Policymaking influences may combine in a nearly infinite
variety of forms with policy moving down from the central authority, up from
the member state governments, and horizontally among the member states and
their institutions. Even within the E.U. and national institutions, policy
development is not necessarily hierarchical. 6
1 See John C. Reitz, Political Economy and Separation of Powers, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PRoss. 579, 618 (2006) ('The United States ... has a legislative system that divides lawmaking powers
among two legislative houses and the President, who has little ability beyond his veto power to control
legislation. It also has robust judicial review and is a federal state in which the states retain extensive
lawmaking powers").
2 See J.A.E. Vervaele, Counteifeiting the Single European Currency (Euro): Towards the
Federalization of Enforcement in the European Union?, 8 CoLUM. J. EuR. L. 151, 151 (2002) ("As opposed to
Nation States, in the European Union there is no complete separation of powers along the lines of the trias
The European Union is based on shared governance between the European
politico doctrine.
Community/European Union and the Member states, being an integrated community legal order.").
3 DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 56-57 (2004).
4 See Peter L. Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What America Can
Learn from Europe and Vice Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645, 676 (2006) ("When the EU has issued a
"directive," setting framework standards that require implementing measures, these measures are commonlybut not invariably-taken by Member States subject to EU controls for their adequacy.").
5 WALTER VAN GERVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POLICY OF STATES AND PEOPLES 159 (2005); see
also id. (noting recognition of this fact by the E.U. Commission).
6 For example, the E.U. Council has nine configurations in which the relevant national ministers
represent the member states in approving E.U. legislation. Thus, the E.U. policy that is imposed on the
member states is to some extent created by the common member-state ministers, and perhaps more
importantly, the combination of the staffs of the member-state departments, the permanent Council staffs, and
the relevant Commission staff. PETER STRAUSS ET AL., NORM CREATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 16-17
(2007), http://www .abanet.org/adminlaw/eu/Reports_Rulemak:ing_06-07-2007 .pdf.
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The E.U. network system requires innovations in the concepts and
strategies of federalism. It exposes challenges in carrying out a unified,
effective, and legitimate implementation of shared programs. Even though the
7
U.S. Constitution aspired to a "more perfect union" among the several states,
it has been held to establish an adversarial relationship between the central
government and its states. 8 This divided federalism combined with the
generally hierarchical allocation of authority presents a useful contrast to the
E.U. network federalism. Network organization might have advantages and,
regardless, may best describe many existing and emerging federal systems,
both national and supranational. 9 Hence, the E.U. and U.S. experiences and
mechanisms offer insights into how to design other federal systems. 10
I.

IMPLEMENTING POLICYMAKING

Beyond the separation of powers issue, governmental entitles must also
consider the legitimacy of delegations from the political bodies to the
implementing bodies. The E.U. has somewhat paralleled the U.S. in accepting
the necessity of delegating implementing policy. The evolution of the U.S.
acceptance of that necessity goes back some distance and probably presages
the ultimate development of E.U. delegation doctrine.

7

U.S. CONST. pmbl.
See Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional Role of SelfInterest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 381 (2001) ("While adversary theory plays
a central role in the history and philosophy of American political theory, its premises also pervade fundamental
provisions of the United States Constitution.").
9 Anne-Marie Slaughter developed the idea of network government.
See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & David T. Zaring, Networking
Goes International: An Update (Washington & Lee Pub. Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-12, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=960484 (providing a literature review of the impressive and growing study of network
governments).
10
Much of the discussion in this Article is informed by the study of and experience with U.S.
administrative Jaw. As society grows outside national borders, so too do government and, consequently,
administrative Jaw. A "global administrative law" is under construction and is recognized as a contributor to
the study of network governments. Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 9, at 221-22. The leaders of that
movement observed, 'The construction of a global administrative law is inevitably shaped and constrained by
existing institutions and principles as well as the shifting patterns of international ordering and the normative
foundations . . . . Within these constraints, many strategies of institutional design are possible." Benedict
Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. IS, 53 (2005).
However, these leaders also cautioned: "Many of the emerging mechanisms of global administrative law stem
from northern and western initiatives, and any attempt at justifying the need for such a body of law must thus
face the challenge of intellectual and political bias." 1d. at 5 I.
8

170

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57

U.S. acceptance evolved through a long process. The earliest U.S. case on
the need to delegate power to the implementing bodies is the 1892 opinion in
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark. ll Relying on a case decided early in U.S.
history, The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 12 the Supreme Court
upheld a statute that gave the President authority to impose retaliatory tariffs if
he "deemed" that American business was being treated unfairly. Justice
Harlan and a majority of the Court claimed that the President could do nothing
under this statute but execute the acts of Congress. He claimed that the
President "was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and
declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect." 13 While
Harlan's opinion suggested limits on the power to delegate, the case is seen as
early recognition that Congress may delegate policymaking authority. 14
The evolution of a generous delegation doctrine was slow but inevitable.
In 1904, the Supreme Court in Buttfield v. Stranahan 15 upheld the delegation
of power in the Tea Inspection Act to the Secretary of the Treasury to establish
standards of tea purity. Subsequently, in United States v. Grimaud, 16 the
Court-while analyzing the power of the Secretary of Agriculture to make
forestry conservation rules-decided to lay down, as a criterion for delegation,
the notion that Congress may establish a general statutory standard and
delegate to the executive the power to "fill up the details" by regulation. 17 And
finally, in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 18 the Court in 1928
upheld another tariff statute and established the principle under which
delegations are approved today: "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such
rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power." 19 Over the years, the Court has accepted very
general language as satisfying the "intelligible principle" requirement, so that

II

143 U.S. 649 (1892).
II U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
13 /d. at 693.
14 See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected a
Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REv. 689, 703 (2006) ("Various scholars have declared the NonDelegation Doctrine, which was first announced by the Supreme Court in Field v. Clark, to be dead.")
(footnote omitted).
15 192 u.s. 470 (1904).
16
220 u.s. 506 (1911).
17
/d. at 511.
18 276 u.s. 394 ( 1928).
19
/d. at 409 (emphasis added).
12
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no challenge is realistically available. 20 A vigorous nondelegation doctrine has
had judicial advocates over the years? 1 But, as Justice Blackmun found in
Mistretta v. United States, 22 "Applying this 'intelligible principle' test to
congressional delegations, our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical
understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.'.23 By
assuming the role to monitor the implementing authority, democratic
accountability is permissibly removed by one level. 24
The potential for the same devolution of authority in supranational
organizations can be demonstrated by examining the evolution of delegated
authority in the E.U. Like in the U.S., the rejection of delegated authority,
consistent with basic law, failed. Early in the E.U.'s history, delegation of
policymaking authority seemed to be prohibited?5 In the 1958 case of Meroni
20 See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166--67 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[l]t is well settled that Congress may delegate legislative
power to independent agencies or to the Executive, and thereby divest itself of a portion of its lawmaking
power .... "). A brief adoption of a vigorous nondelegation doctrine, however, occurred in the mid-twentieth
century. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935). Since 1935, the Supreme Court has not invalidated a statute on delegation grounds.
21
See, e.g., Nat'! Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258, 274--77 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,624-27 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part). Legal scholars tend to favor a strong nondelegation doctrine. See,
e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, the Rules/Standards Dilemma and the Une
Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV. 189, 197-98 (1999); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium:
A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1406-D7 (2000); Ernest Gellhorn &
Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 989-92 (1999); David
Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 731-32 (1999);
David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL
STUD. 413, 413-17 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315-16 (2000).
22
488 u.s. 361 (1989).
23
/d. at 372.
24
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721,
1749 (2002). Posner and Vermeule state:

Accountability is not lost through delegation, then; it is transformed. Congress is accountable for
the performance of agencies generally, and people properly evaluate the agencies'
accomplishments as well as failures when deciding whether to hold members responsible for
authorizing the agency, or for failing to curtail its power, fix its mistakes, or eliminate it
altogether.
/d.

25 This discussion builds on ideas that I formulated as part of the European Union Administrative Law
Project with George Hermann and other administrative law scholars. For additional information on this
Union
Administrative Law Project,
project,
see
American
Bar Association:
European
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/eu/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2007).
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26

v. High Authority, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) severely limited
authority delegations. 27 Having been decided very early in the history of the
European Community, this case set the parameters for delegation in a much
simpler governmental context. Specifically, the court held that institutions
may not "confer upon the authority, powers different from those which the
delegating authority itself received under the Treaty." 28 It also held that the
delegation must involve "clearly defined executive powers the exercise of
which can, therefore, be subject to strict review in the light of criteria
determined by the delegating authority." 29 The court dictated that the exercise
of this power "must be entirely subject to the supervision of the [delegating
institution]." 3 Feeling that the delegation would upset the institutional balance
envisioned in the Treaty unless all these conditions were met, 31 the court ruled
that the delegation "gives those agencies a degree of latitude which implies a
wide margin of discretion and cannot be considered as compatible with the
requirements of the Treaty." 32

°

Still, scholars of European Law argue that limitations on delegation are not
overly restrictive in reality. In fact, "the Meroni opinion might suggest to U.S.
administrative lawyers no more restriction than the current state of the U.S.
nondelegation doctrine." 33 For example, if the court is interpreted to require
"criteria determined by the delegating authority," 34 this requirement would be
analogous to the "intelligible principle" requirement announced by the
Supreme Court at the beginning of the twentieth century. 35 However, Meroni
could be interpreted to require that the delegating institution itself ultimately
make the decision. This interpretation would explain the court's choice to
include the language "subject to strict review . . . by the delegating
authority." 36 In short, Meroni's restriction may be interpreted in a variety of
ways.

26

Case 9/56, 195711958 E.C.R. 133.

27

/d. at 151.

28

/d. at 170.
/d. at 172.

29
30
31

32

Id.
/d.
Id. at 174.

33
Charles Koch, Jr., Primer for U.S. Lawyers on European Union Government and Law 28 (Aug. 2007)
(on file with author), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/eu!Primer_v8-07 .pdf.
34 Meroni, 195711958 E.C.R. at 172.
35
See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
36
Meroni, 195711958 E.C.R. at 172.
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Yet, the Meroni decision's practical impact is overstated. As Geradin and
Petit assert: "the implications of the Meroni doctrine should not be
exaggerated." 37 Geradin and Petit explain that the court's reliance on
institutional balance naturally leads to acceptance of delegation to improve the
quality of the decisionmaking body both by decreasing the workload on the
delegating entity and by transferring technical issues to experts? 8 As such,
Meroni might be seen as the equivalent to the early U.S. case Field v. Clark, in
which the Supreme Court upheld a statute that gave the President the authority
to impose retaliatory tariffs upon a finding that U.S. businesses were being
treated unfairly?9 Because the Supreme Court found that the President "was
the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event
upon which its expressed will was to take effect,"40 the actual opinion could be
said to limit delegation. Perhaps it presages European doctrinal evolution to
note that this opinion has, over time, been characterized as an early recognition
that Congress may make extensive delegations. 41
Arguably, then, E.U. delegation doctrine is evolving in the direction of the
liberal U.S. doctrine. In contrast, however, devolution of this authority must
be quite different in the U.S. divided federalism and the E.U. network
federalism. In the U.S., while the power to create policy is readily conferred
(expressly or implicitly) on federal agencies, such policymaking is not and
cannot be conferred on state administrative authorities. 42 On the other hand,
the E.U. network, by utilizing member state administrative authorities,
necessarily confers substantial policymaking authority on those authorities.

37

Damien Geradin & Nicolas Petit, The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels:
Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform 15 (Monet Working Paper 01/04, 2004), available at http://
www .jeanmonnetprograrn.org/papers/04/040 I 0 l.pdf.
38
/d. at 15-16.
39
143 U.S. 649, 692-94 (1892) (discussing The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, I I U.S. (7
Cranch) 382 (1813)).
40 /d. at 693, 698-99.
41 For further discussion of the evolution of the E.U.'s delegation powers, see CARL FREDRIK
BERGSTROM, COMITOLOGY: DELEGATION OF POWERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM

94-97, 302-08 (2005). The ECJ has accepted the delegation of the authority to adopt implementing measures,
an increasingly large category, so long as the delegation is to either to the Commission or the Council itself
under the Consolidated Treaty. See European Union: Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union
and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 32 I) 135, art. 202
[hereinafter Consolidated Treaty].
42 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,926-27 (1997) (holding that the federal government may not
"commandeer" state executive institutions and hence may not delegate authority to state executive institutions
to make implementing policy).
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II. THE "CHOICE" BETWEEN NETWORK AND DIVIDED FEDERALISM

The experiences of these two systems, among others, demonstrate that, in
modem government, delegations of implementing authority are inevitable and,
the law must evolve to accommodate them. The delegation question then
becomes largely a practical question. Delegations within a federal system
complicate these practical considerations. Federal systems always seem to
face substantial pressure to devolve implementing policy choices to the local
level. On the other hand, joint action is the raison d'etre for federalism, and
hence, the lines of authority must facilitate unity. U.S. and E.U. federalism
approach these problems in nearly opposite ways, and the contrast adds to the
variety of potential design strategies.
A. The E. U. Network

The E.U. "constitutional" structure incorporates member-state
governmental institutions directly into the E.U. governmental structure. The
European system relies on a variety of legislative and executive bodies to
implement E.U. law. At the first level, basic documents, presently treaties,
were accepted and continue to be reviewed by the member states. 43 At the
second level, legislative institutions controlled by the member states, the
Council and Commission, are dominant, despite the fact that the directly
elected European Parliament has gained power over the years. 44 The
legislation passed through this legislative process is generally directed at the
member states. Some of this legislation, such as "regulations" and "decisions,"
may have "direct effect," whereby they apply directly to citizens and may be
43 The basic or constitutional documents of the E.U. have been created by the various treaties signed by
European nations admitted into the Union. These treaties have been consolidated into one unified document.
See Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. I. So far, a European constitution has failed to gain popular
support.
44 Legislative authority is divided among three institutions: Commission, Council, and Parliament. See
id. art. 251. Parliament has the weakest role, although that role has increased over the years. Most legislation
today follows the co-decision process. The Commission proposes all legislation. See id. The Council adopts
legislation from this proposal usually through a weighed voting called "qualified majority," which is generally
proportioned according to member state populations. See id. The proposal is sent to Parliament which may
adopt it, whereby the legislation is enacted, or reject it, whereby it fails. See id. If Parliament amends the
proposal, then the proposal returns to the Council and the Council and Commission develop another proposal.
See id. If Parliament rejects that proposal as well, then the Council President, with Parliament President,
convenes a "Conciliation Committee" within six weeks with equal members from the Council and Parliament.
See id. Again, the Commission enters the process and facilitates reconciliation. If the Committee agrees on a
')oint text," that text must be approved by the Council and Parliament. See id. If either does not approve the
joint text, the measure fails. See id.
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enforced by citizens. 45 Nonetheless, these measures, in fact, mostly operate
through the member states. Other E.U. instruments, such as "directives,"
formally operate only through the member states. 46 In sum, even at the central
legislative level, the member states generally must take steps to give practical
effect to the E.U. legislation. 47
The actual system for carrying out these constitutional powers commingles
responsibilities further. The core legislative institution is the Council. Each
member state is represented on the Council and participates through weighed
voting depending largely on population. 48 However, different individuals
represent the member states depending on the subject matter at issue. For
example, all national ministries with agricultural portfolios would constitute
the Council in meetings dealing with that subject. Therefore, the Council itself
not only reflects the interests of the member states but joins together those in
the member states concerned about particular matters. This necessarily results
in inter-agency conversation establishing one web of the network.
Even Brussels-based staffs have become part of the network. For example,
permanent representatives of the member states are called the Committee of
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and carry on Council affairs one level
below the Council.49 The committee facilitates a very high level Brusselsbased staff network. On occasions, COREPER members will sit as state
representatives on the Council and vote to refer a matter to COREPER.

45 A definition of "direct effect" is the capacity of an E.U. law to confer rights on an individual directly,
as opposed to through action by the member state. See generally id. art. 72.
46 However, a so-called "vertical direct effect" compels member-state institutions, as well as their
legislatures, to implement directives so that national courts and administrators may be bound in practice to
apply the provisions of directives. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, E.U. LAW: TEXT, CASES AND
MATERIALS 208-09 (3d ed. 2003). "Vertical direct effect" has also been referred to as "administrative direct
effect." /d.
47 The involvement of the member states allows for special attention to cultural diversity. Protecting
diversity is an overarching concern of the E.U. Any future constitution-making can be expected to at least
maintain and perhaps further protect that diversity. See Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutional Principles, in
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 42-49 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jurgen Bast eds., 2006);
see also id. at 42 ("Principles protecting diversity became necessary when principles furthering unity began to
shape reality.").
48 Less is done by unanimous voting, and more is accomplished by a "qualified majority." See
Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 205.
49 TREVOR C. HARTLEY, EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS
30 (2004).
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The E.U. Commission serves several functions. One function is as the
executive body, thereby operating as an implementing institution.50 In that
regard, the E.U. Commission interacts with the other E.U. institutions and the
member state administrative authorities.
Each commissioner has a
"competence" and works with member state administrations across those
designated interests. 51 The commissioners are nominated by a member state
52
and often signify a special concern of the member state. The Commission
formally acts as a "college" in which it discusses and furthers certain policy
agendas upon which any number of institutional and member state influences
might work. 53 The Commission also initiates all legislation and reenters the
legislative process at various points in the negotiations between the Council
and the European Parliaments. 54 Again, this legislative function necessitates
other webs. In short, the webs around the functioning of the Commission are
numerous and perhaps beyond identification, even by the Commission itself.
The European Parliament is directly elected by the citizens of Europe.
Nonetheless, these elections take place in the member states. 55 The Members
of the European Parliament (MEPs) are designated and seated by parties.
These parties run the gamut from conservative to liberal. Thus, European
Parliament also fosters a web among the state parties and pan-European
parties, as well as officials from those parties.
Rattling around inside this amorphous governmental system are various
committees. The Treaty itself establishes a committee to represent local
interests, "the Committee of the Regions," 56 and a committee to represent
special interests, "the Economic and Social Committee."57 In addition, a large
number of "comitology" committees have been constituted to supervise

50
See JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW 16-17 (3d ed. 1992); see also K.K. DuVivier, The
United States as a Democratic Ideal? International Lessons in Referendum Democracy, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 821,
854 (2006) ('The European Commission is a quasi-executive body appointed by the governments of each of
the member states.").
51
See STEINER, supra note 50, at 16; see also Rafael Leal-Areas, The EU Institutions and Their Modus
Operandi in the World Trading System, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 125, 145 (2005) (describing the competence of
the trade commissioner).
52
See STEINER, supra note 50, at 16.
53 !d.
54 !d.
55 Francis G. Jacobs, Constitutional Control of European Elections: The Scope of Judicial Review, 28
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1049, 1052 (2005) (noting that "elections are, broadly, organized by the Member States,
and largely in accordance with national rules").
56
Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 263.
57
!d. art. 257.
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implementing measures. 58 The policymaking function of these committees
will be discussed further below. It suffices here to note that these committees
provide additional avenues of access and policy influence. Moreover, although
designed for specialized purposes, they are appointed by the member states and
The
result in another type of interaction among those governments.
committees then add another web in the E.U. network.
Even the briefest description of the network, which this is, may not ignore
the "civil society." European governments, including the E.U., have formally
invited and facilitated participation by the public interest community, the "civil
society," and public interest nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The
Commission has included in this category organizations that are not-for-profit,
voluntary, have some institutional or otherwise formal existence (as opposed to
ad hoc and/or informal), are independent (particularly of government), and are
not pursuing the commercial or professional interests ot their members. 59 To
date, much of these organizations' influence occurs inside the Commission.
Thus, the dialogue within a specialist directorate may include private
organizations. 60 Special access to Parliament and the Council is more
. but growmg.
. 61
pro bl ematlc,
The European Council (separate from the above-described Council) is an
institution in which the member states meet summit-style to discuss more
general policy. 62 In addition, the E.U. presidency (not an individual) passes
from state to state every six months. 63 Together, these institutions tend to
create yet other webs between the prior and following summits and
presidencies and among member states supporting or resisting certain panEuropean policies in these forums.
The court system is nominally more hierarchical than these other
institutions, but it too has its network aspects. For one thing, an uneasy peace
58 See Michelle Egan & Dieter Wolf, Regulation and Comitology: The EC Committee System in
Regulatory Perspective, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 499, 511 (1998).
59
European Commission, The Commission and Non-Governmental Organizations: Building a Stronger
Partnership, at 3-4, COM (200) II final (Jan. 2000) (Commission discussion paper, on file with author).
60 Giampiero Alhadeff & Simon Wilson, European Civil Society Coming of Age, Global Policy Forum
(May 2002), http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/eu/2002/05civsoc.htm.
61 !d.
62 See Treaty on European Union, art. 4, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) I [hereinafter EU Treaty].
63 Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the Accession of Austria,
Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM lNT'L L.J. 1092, 1126 (1995) ("From the inception of the European
Community, the presidency of the Council has rotated in alphabetical order among the States, each holding it
for six months.").
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exists between the E.U. courts, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the
Court of First Instance (CFI), and the national courts. Slowly, the E.U. courts
have exerted their supremacy, but that status is unstable. 64 A judicial dialogue,
rather than bottom-down command, has emerged. Added to this judicial web
is the reference process whereby any "tribunal" may refer an E.U. question to
the E.U. courts and, hence, may bypass the highest national courts. 65 The
European judicial web is expanded by the opinions of the European Court of
Human Rights, which, while not an E.U. court, nonetheless contributes to the
European judicial dialogue.
The E.U. network includes several national and E.U. administrative
authorities. Chiti characterizes these authorities according to the "indirect
administration" model and the "co-administration" model. 66 Under the indirect
administration model, the E.U. authorities are not vested with any power and
instead rely on the national bodies to attain E.U. objectives. Under the coadministration model, competences are shared between the E.U. and the
member state administrations. 67 At present, member state agencies (which
European scholars tend to lump together as "national regulatory agencies" or
"NRAs") perform much of the European administrative functions. A growing
number of E.U. agencies (which Europeans call "European agencies" or
"EAs") have taken on some of the administrative responsibilities, but even so,
they tend to coordinate with NRAs. 68

64 See THE EUROPEAN COURTS & NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 95-98 (AnneMarie Slaughter et al eds., 1998) [hereinafter EUROPEAN & NATIONAL COURTS].
65
Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 234.
66
Edoardo Chili, Decentralisation and Integration into the Community Administrations: A New
Perspective on European Agencies, 10 EUR. L.J. 402, 408, 410 (2004).
67
/d. at 409 .
68
.
Chiti notes an "explosion of the agency model" in the E.U. Edoardo Chili, The Emergence of a
Community Administration: The Case of European Agencies, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 309, 311 (2000). The
number of European Agencies (EAs) has increased from four in 1993 to fifteen in 2003. /d. It is expected that
this number will continue to increase. /d. at 309-11. General understanding of these E.U. administrative
bodies might be built around Geradin's identification of seven common features. Damien Geradin, The
Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the E. U. Should Learn from American Experience, ll
COLUM. J. EuR. L. I, 24-27 (2004). Geradin identifies the following seven features:
I.
Agencies generally have a limited mandate, which is laid down by the establishing legislation and
consists of tasks of a technical, scientific, and managerial nature.
2.
Most have very limited powers, usually relating to information and coordination, and may not
issue binding decisions;
3.
All operate under the direction of an executive director;
4.
They have an administrative or management board, usually made up of representative from the
member states;
5.
They generally function through committees, or committees form some part of their structure;
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The avenues of policy influence, whether ultimately expressed in what
Americans would identify as legislation or in some implementing measure, are
extensive and growing. The above describes only some of the more apparent
webs in the network. It suffices for this Article to state that relevant policy
agendas are buffeted by winds from many directions. Policymaking goes
down, up, and sideways. Different institutions, E.U. and national, have input
and yet are affected by others. Hence, the E.U. governance has been in the
process of developing mechanisms to rationalize its policymaking functions in
network government.
B. The Simple U.S. Model

While there is certainly a dialogue between the U.S. government and its
constituent states, the structure is much more hierarchical and responsibilities
can be more confidently determined. Because the competences (in European
terms) are divided between the national government and the states, the
dialogue is more transparent. Because the policy processes are more
hierarchical, both within the national and state governments and between the
national government and the states where cooperation takes place, lines of
authority and influence are usually easier to follow.

6.

They are decentralized in the sense both that they are withdrawn from the centralized
responsibility of the Commission and they are located in various parts of the E.U.; and
7.
Most are created under Article 308, the generalized "necessary and proper" provision of the
Treaty, sometimes in conjunction with more specific authority.
See id. See generally Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 308. Although not all agencies have all these
characteristics, identification of these actual or potential characteristics creates some coherence. See
Xenophon A. Yataganas, Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the European Union: The Relevance of the
American Model of Independent Agencies (Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law
and Justice, Working Paper No. 3/01, 2001), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/Oll
010301.html (dividing existing agencies into four functional categories: (I) agencies serving the operation of
the internal market (regulatory model); (2) agencies providing information through a. network of partners
(monitoring model); (3) agencies promoting social dialogue (cooperation model); and (4) agencies operating as
subcontractors to the European public service (executive model)); see also Damien Geradin & Nicolas Petit,
The Development of Agencies at E. U. and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform
48-49 (Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law and Justice, Working Paper No.
01/04, 2004) (stating that "executive agencies ... comprise all European agencies that are responsible for (i)
purely managerial tasks ... ; or (ii) observatory roles ... ; or (iii) missions of cooperation"); id. ("[D]ecisionmaking agencies ... comprise all agencies that have the power to enact legal instruments ... or ... enjoy
considerable influence over the adoption of final decisions by the Commission," even though they lack formal
decisionmakif!g authority); id. at 49 ("Regulatory agencies comprise all European E.U. agencies that enjoy the
types of powers enjoyed by the NRAs, . . . including a discretionary power to translate broad legislation
guidelines into concrete instruments.").
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Throughout its history, the power of the U.S.'s central government over the
states has been unstable and contestable. In the beginning, the U.S.
Constitution brought together thirteen "states," which considered themselves
independent sovereigns. Many of these states, hungering after nationhood,
reluctantly traded the ideal of confederation for "a more perfect union." 69
Union was in fact a very near thing from the start and continued to be for sixtyplus years; it had to be settled by the bloodiest war in U.S. history. 70 In global
terms, the U.S. faced, and still faces, a conflict between the intergovernmental
ideal and the supranat~onal ideal. "States' rights" are well respected in U.S.
constitutional doctrine and popular opinion. 71 The supranational ideal reached
its peak in the 1970s, and its power has been eroding since. 72
This legal construction of the strong sense of state sovereignty starts with
the judicial interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
In an early decision, the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia73 ruled that a
state could be sued by a citizen of another state in federal court.74 The
Eleventh Amendment-which withholds federal court jurisdiction over suits
against a state by a citizen of another state-was very quickly passed in
response. It took one-hundred years after its ratification for the Supreme Court
to decide that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits all private suits against the
states in federal court. 75 Because the limited scope of the Eleventh
Amendment is expressed in some of the clearest language in the U.S.
Constitution, the Court had to "find" state sovereignty that transcends the
actual language of the Eleventh Amendment in the original Constitution.76
After the Court's decision in Hans v. Louisiana, the seeds of state
sovereignty grew. In a reaction to an extreme commitment to the central,
federal government, the Supreme Court evolved a version of state sovereignty
that limited congressional action as well as protected the states from private

69

U.S. CONST. pmbl.

70

See Gloria J. Browne-Marshall, Early American Conflicts and Modem African Practices: A
Comparative Commentary on Constitutionalism, 10 JLSA J.INT'L & COMP. L. 305, 307 (2004).
71
See Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental "States'
Rights," 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 223-24 (2004).
72 See id.

u.s. 419 (1793)

73

2

74

See id.
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890). This protection may be circumvented through the dubious

75

device of so-called "officer suits" whereby a state official may be sued to stop implementation of state law
allegedly violating federal law. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
76
Hans, 134 U.S. at 11-21.
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lawsuits. 77 Some of the law that permitted Congress to "abrogate" state
sovereignty, which had emerged in the heyday of nationalism, began to
deteriorate. The Court expanded the constitutional limits on national authority
so that Congress, not just federal courts, could not derogate state sovereignty. 78
This trend led to two Supreme Court decisions that prohibited Congress
from "commandeering" state governments. New York v. United States79
invalidated federal efforts to direct state legislatures, and Printz v. United
States80 invalidated federal efforts to command state and local executive
officials. That is, Congress could not force state governments to implement
federal law. Of particular relevance here, the Court in Printz ruled that
Congress could not commandeer state officers, even as a temporary
expedience. 81 Since these two decisions, federal administrative programs have
no longer been able to co-opt state authorities. Instead, if Congress wishes to
employ state or local administrative officials, it must now induce or coerce the
states into cooperating. 82
These two rulings solidified the U.S.'s divided federalism. The wisdom of
divided federalism, however, is much in doubt. U.S. federalism does not exist
in isolation, and comparisons to other forms of federalism might have been
useful. As Justice Breyer observed in Printz,
Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of
other nations, and there may be relevant political and structural
differences between their systems and our own. But their experience
may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of
different solutions to a common legal problem-in this case the
problem of reconciling central authority with the need to preserve the
77 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 502 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990);
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1869).
78
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 ( 1996) (holding that the Commerce Clause, article I, section 8,
did not authorize Congress to regulate the states). But see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coli. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006)
(holding that the Bankruptcy Clause, article I, section 8, empowers Congress to affect the states in
bankruptcy).
79 505 u.s. 144 (1992).
80 521 u.s. 898 (1997).
81
Printz established the principle that Congress may not commandeer state administrative ·officials. ld
at 935. Printz involved an injunction action brought by two county sheriffs who found themselves in the
statutory category of "chief law enforcement officers" (CLEO). The sheriffs objected to being compelled to
implement certain requirements of the "Brady Act," which regulated firearm sales. /d. at 902-{)4.
82 See id. at 929 ("[This Court] upheld the statutory provisions at issue precisely because they did not
commandeer state government, but merely imposed preconditions to continued state regulation of an otherwise
pre-empted field .... ") (distinguishing Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62
(1982)).
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liberty-enhancing autonomy of a small constituent governmental
.
83
entity.
However, the author of the Printz opinion, Justice Scalia, resisted referencing
to other systems.
Several commentators have identified defects in Justice Scalia's
constitutional reasoning in Printz. 84 The constitutional language in support of
the anti-commandeering holding is virtually nonexistent. Justice Scalia, who
has been skeptical, to the say the least, of legislative history in general, based
his majority oEinion largely on legislative history and "off-stage" legislative
history at that. 5 Moreover, it is incontestable that the federal-state relationship
radically and fundamentally changed in 1865, as codified in the Fourteenth
Amendment in particular. 86 As precedent, the case is weakened by the 5-4
majority. 87 Regardless of the skimpy majority, the absence of supporting
constitutional language, and the vague historical support presented, Printz's
anti-commandeering principle has passed into U.S. constitutional jurisprudence
as established doctrine.
In the end, the supporters of this anti-commandeering doctrine cannot
escape the charge that it is unabashedly result-oriented, driven by a view of
good (U.S.) government principles. 88 Yet, good government might be
83 /d. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
84 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts:
Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32lNo. L. REv. 71 (1998) (arguing that Congress's Article
I power to employ the state courts also supports the power to commandeer state executive officials).
85 Printz, 521 U.S. at 928-29.
86 See CONST. amend. XIV.
87 Printz, 521 U.S. at 900--01.
88 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes
Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 893-94 (1998). Hills explains:
When the national government commandeers services from nonfederal governments, it
essentially demands that such governments provide in-kind contributions to the national
government. But such demands can inefficiently deter voters and politicians from participating
in state and local politics. In effect, when the national government commandeers state and local
regulatory processes, it undemtines the very institutions that the national government seeks to
exploit.

/d.
Ernest Young has observed that federalism design should not only protect the sub-governments, but it
should also protect individuals through its "dual security." See Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State
Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 11 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1612, 1729 (2002) ("While the strength of [U.S.] federalism may have declined in tandem with the danger of
strife arising from internal differences, it is not at all clear that the need to guard against centralized
encroachments on individualliberry has likewise decreased.").
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furthered by giving Congress the flexibility to choose and justify various types
of state implementation. 89 In Printz, Justice Scalia worried that federal
command of state governments does not show sufficient respect-perhaps
required by the Constitution-for the state governments. 90 In his dissent in
Printz, however, Justice Breyer observed that other federal systems "do so in
part because they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the
independent authority of the 'state,' member nation, or other subsidiary
government, and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well.'.91 The E.U.
experience suggests that a cooperative-dialectic philosophy may in fact temper
antagonism between the states and the central authority. Furthermore, it seems
significant that the E.U. member states agreed to an integrated system because
they felt such system respected their sovereignty while still getting the job
done.
The U.S. hierarchical conception of delegation contributes to the states'
defensiveness. Even in those programs in which the states "voluntarily"
participate, there is no question as to which sovereign is dominant. Were U.S.
federalism constructed more along the lines of a multidimensional network,
rather than divided and hierarchical, legal doctrine might not have moved
towards insulating the states. Certainly, one designing or reconstructing a
federal system elsewhere might take heed.

89 Daniel Halberstam and Roderick Hills found that rigidity in German federalism prevents more tailored
design: 'The responsibilities of federation and liinder bureaucracies are defined ex ante by the Grundgesetz
[the German Constitution or "Basic Law"); thus the German system does not allow for greater or fewer
enforcement responsibilities to be allocated to the Lander based on any Land's track record of enforcement."
Daniel Halberstam & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., State Autonomy in Germany and the United States, 514 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 173, 181 (2001).
90
Printz, 521 U.S. at 907-15
91
/d. at 976--77 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "Believe" may be the operative word here. As Daniel
Kelemen's empirical work suggests,

The impact of fragmentation on state discretion is counterintuitive . . . . Where the power of the
federal government is highly concentrated, state governments will enjoy wide discretion in
implementing federal laws. By contrast, where the power of the federal government is highly
fragmented among a number of veto players, state governments will be subject to more stringent
controls and enjoy less discretion.
R. DANIEL KELEMEN, THE RULES OF FEDERALISM: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY POL!T!CS IN THE E.U. AND
BEYOND

15 (2004).
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III. CmZEN EXPECTATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS

Although federalism analysis usually concentrates on governments and
people, federal governments actually face a more perplexing challenge:
satisfying a diverse citizenry. Citizens have expectations and any system must
be sensitive to those expectations. These expectations are formed from a
myriad of influences, of which social, political, and legal culture is particularly
potent and mysterious. For network systems, meeting these expectations is
extremely problematic. Since ordinary citizens become engaged when policy
is actually applied to them, implementing machineries must make significant
contributions to citizen comfort levels.
In general, implementing policy is developed through two major types of
actions. The process may focus directly on formulating general and
prospective policy. This category of implementing policymaking is known in
the U.S. as "rulemaking" and in the parliamentary governments of the E.U. as
"delegated legislation" or as "decrees.'m
The network devices for
implementing policy of general, prospective application strain to deal with
diversity, and hence, new innovations have proven necessary. While the
procedures discussed below are useful, more development in general
implementing policymaking procedures for network federalism will be
necessary.
Implementing policymaking may also evolve from administrative
resolutions of individual disputes. The E.U. treaty regime carefully controls
centrifugal judicial policymaking in individual dispute resolution. 93 However,
U.S. experience teaches that a focus on judicial proceedings is substantially
underinclusive. 94 Necessarily, the vast majority of individual implementing
disputes are resolved by administrative adjudicators. 95 Technically, policy
confronted by these adjudicators could be submitted to the E.U. courts.
However, because these administrative agencies are numerous and facially
carry out member state implementing policy, they are unlikely to be so
92
While the E.U. is not precisely a parliamentary system, its processes naturally evolve along those lines
so that an understanding of its general implementing processes is informed by reference to the parliamentary
model.
93 The Treaty allows lower national courts to bypass the highest courts and go directly to the E. U. courts.
Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 234 ("[A]ny court or tribunal ... may ... request the Court of Justice
to give a ruling [on a question of E.U.law].").
94
See Charles E. Grassley & Charles Pou, Jr., Congress, the Executive Branch and the Dispute
Resolution Process, 1992 J. DISP. RESOL. I, 1-3 (I 992).
95 /d.
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referred. E.U. policy implications are likely to reach only beyond the local
process if the decisions are reviewed by a court. Again, experience teaches
that only a small percentage of policies are reviewed by a court. 96 So, along
with processes for generalized implementing policy, network federalism
presents special challenges regarding implementing policy in individual
dispute resolutions.
A. General and Prospective Implementing Policymaking

For years, Europeans have been considering the advantages of the U.S.
process for general implementing policymaking, known as "notice and
comment rulemaking." Francesca Bignarni is among those who have made a
strong case for transposing that process into the E.U. implementing
processes. 97 However, the E.U. experience suggests that while this process
may be useful, it is of limited value in the network government. In the end, it
may even be found that it is simply inappropriate in that context.
U.S. administrative law has trumpeted for generations its notice and
comment rulemaking. In the 1940s, the uniform act, the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), adopted that procedure as the basic rulemaking
process. 98 Generally, the process requires public notice of the proposed rule,
an opportunity for comment, publication of the final rule, and a written
justification with findings supporting the final rule. 99 The final rule is subject
to judicial review by generalist courts, but that review is generally severely
limited. 100 Rules so promulgated, "legislative rules," have the "force of law"
101
and, hence, are binding on the public, the agency, and the courts.
In the notice and comment process, participation is unlimited. All
"interested persons" have that right, and that term refers literally to anyone
"interested." 102 Over the years, this process has proven to be a largely costeffective mechanism for fostering transparency and open access to general
96

See James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central Panels and AU Final Order Authority,
38 IND. L. REV. 401,430--31 (2005).
97
See Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A Call for
Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 451,514-15 (1999).
98 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
99 See id.
100 See James F. Smith, Comparing Federal Judicial Review of Administrative Coun Decisions in the
United States and Canada, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 503, 535-44 (2000).
101 /d.
102 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) C'lnhe agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the
ru1emaking ....").
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policymaking at the implementation stage. It is not without claims of
procedural paralysis. 103 Nonetheless, the notice and comment process remains
the bedrock of U.S. regulatory decisionmaking and often leads to important
policymaking and major policy shifts-results that are perhaps impossible
through legislative action. 104 Still, other legal cultures, even common law
ones, have not adopted this procedure, although they are well aware of it. 105
While a useful device for developing national policy, the notice and
comment process serves cooperative federalism less well. That is, the states do
not have any more standing than other "interested persons" because they are
not the promulgators of national implementing policy. Instead, the E.U. is
compelled to "privilege" the member states in the regulatory process. The
member states are direct and active participants both within the E.U.
government and at implementation stages.

103 See, e.g., Thomas McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J.
1385, 1385 (1992) (asserting that "the rulemaking process has become increasingly rigid and burdensome");
see also Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency
Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997) (calling for a better balance between unbridled participation
and facilitating deliberation).
104
One particularly pervasive example is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's rules that
completely reorganized the electricity industry, starting with Order 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540
(May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.P.R. pts 35 & 385). The Supreme Court addressed the permissibility of
the agency's actions in New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 535 U.S. I (2002) (holding that PERC policy
choices were not outside the scope of its authority). Another example is the Social Security Administration's
rule defining a core element of the disability benefits program. Rules for Adjudicating Disability Claims in
Which Vocational Factors Must Be Considered, 43 Fed. Reg. 55349 (Nov. 28, 1978) (to be codified at 20
C.P.R. pts. 404 & 416). The Supreme Court addressed the permissibility of these regulations in Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (holding that reliance on agency guidelines was consistent with the Social
Security Act and that such guidelines were not arbitrary or capricious); see also 16 C.P.R. § 423.6 (2007)
(Federal Trade Commission rule resulting in "care labels" on nearly all apparel); 21 C.P.R. § 101.9 (2006)
(Food and Drug Administration rule requiring nutritional labels on "all products intended for human
consumption and offered for sale").
Some 4,000 new rules and 3,000 proposed rules are published each year. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND
BUDGET, 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LocAL, AND TRIBUNAL ENTITIES (2006), http:l/www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg/2006_cb/2006_cb_final_report.pdf. Indeed, U.S. agencies produce well over 4,000 final rules each
year. See id. The Office of Management and Budget's 2006 report to Congress stated that between 1981,
when it began to compile records, and 2005, 118,375 final rules were published in the Federal Register. The
annual average would then be 4,375 over twenty-five years. !d. at 29 n.54.
105 Janet McLean, Divergent Legal Conceptions of the State: Implications for Global Administrative Law,
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 167, 168 (2005) ("For the most part, the ex ante notice and comment rulemaking
procedures that characterize U.S. administrative law have not been embraced in other common law
jurisdictions.").
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With few exceptions, the member states will provide the implementing
authorities. The E.U. may command the states to do so. Indeed, in the end,
citizens will likely not perceive that the national regulation was motivated by
an E.U. measure. In fact, member states do not have "deniability"; hence, they
have justifiably insisted on active involvement in the development of the
regulation itself. They participate at every level: from the delegation of
legislation, through the implementation of legislation, to necessary
administrative implementation, and the resulting policy.
Nonetheless, the absence of a clear hierarchy and division of authority
requires additional participatory devices.
One device is the specialist
106
committees.
The treaty itself establishes committees that must be
consulted-a directive Americans would characterize as the legislative
process. 107 These committees bring regions and economically significant
groups within the legislative process. 108 Similarly, "comitology" committees
blend expertise and special interests. 109 Formally, these committees monitor
the Commission's exercise of delegated power to promulgate "implementing
measures." 110 The committees are forums for discussion and dialogue with the
Commission. The procedures which govern relations between the Commission

106
See Michelle Egan & Dieter Wolf, Regulation and Comitology: The EC Committee System in
Regulatory Perspective, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 499, 513 (1998) (defining "specialist committees" as "a number

of national specialists in various policy fields").
107 Consolidated Treaty, supra note 41, art. 257,263.
108
!d. art. 257 (The Economic and Social Committee); id. art. 273 (The Committee of the Regions).
109
Alexandra Gatto, Governance in the European Context: A Legal Perspective, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
487, 50 I (2006) ("Comito logy strictu sensu defines those committees composed of national representatives
which assist or control the Commission in the exercise of its implementing powers."). Gatto further explains:
The term comitology, however, has acquired a broader meaning to include not only committees
which intervene at different stages of the decision making process (the policy-making and
implementation committees), but also those that provide the opinion of broad socioeconomic
interest groups (interest committees) and scientific expertise and information (scientific
committees).

!d.
110
Currently, there are some 247 committees broken into three major categories: advisory committees,
management committees, and regulatory committees. Under the "advisory procedure," the Commission must
submit its proposal to a committee but a negative reaction does not affect the Commission's powers. PAUL
CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, E.U. LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 151-52 (3d ed. 2003). Under the
"management procedures," the relevant committee must approve the Commission's draft by a qualified
majority. !d. at 152. Or, the Commission may adopt the committee recommendations and the amended
proposal proceeds. !d. Even if the Commission does not adopt the committee's recommendations, the
Commission's proposal may still go forward but the Council is notified. !d. Under the "regulatory
procedure," if the committee disagrees, the Commission must put its draft before the Council, which may
reject it. !d.
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and the committees are based on models set out in the Council's "comitology
decision" of June 28, 1999. 111 The member state governments are engaged in
all of these committee processes by, at least, appointing their memberships.
The committee system overcomes practical obstacles, such as language,
ethnicity, and resources, to obtain broad and diverse views, as well as to
incorporate expertise and satisfy member state governments.
The committee mechanism is not without its problems. Comitology was
intended to increase accountability, but many observe that, in fact, it has
112
decreased transparency and added to the democracy deficit.
For example,
Ian Ward described the comitology system as a "network [that] strengthens its
own power whilst further distancing governance from the principles of
democracy, accountability and transparency." 113 Bignami described the
comitology process as "shrouded in secrecy," because it prevents MEPs from
checking bargaining within the committees. 114 In Rothmans International v.
Commission, 115 the CFI attacked the problem of transparency by ruling that the
committees were under the Commission's control. 116 Despite improvements to
117
the committee system, these criticisms persist.
Nonetheless, the potential for
real inclusiveness in network government cannot be denied.
Formal inclusion of the "civil society" also helps assure that diverse
interests are included. As discussed above, European governments, including
the E.U., invite and facilitate participation by the public interest community,
the civil society, and public interest nongovernmental organizations. These
organizations, at both the E.U. and national levels, facilitate broad participation
in implementing policy throughout the network. The danger is that, having
been brought into the system, these organizations may, to some extent, be co-

111 Council Decision 1999/468/EC, OJ. (L 184) 23, 26 (laying down the procedures for the exercise of
implementing powers conferred on the Commission), amended by Council Decision 2006/512/EC, O.J. (L
200) II.
112
See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What America
Can Learn from Europe, and Vice Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645, 682 (2006) ("[l]t is unclear that these
processes, either, result in exposure to or engagement of the public.").
113
IAN WARD, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LAW 68 (2d ed. 2003).
114
Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice
and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 451 (1999). The Second Comitology Decision sought to
increase access but with little success. See BERGSTROM, supra note 41, at 271-78.
115
CaseT-188/97, 1999 E.C.R. U-2463.
116
Seeid.
II? STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 6 at 74--75.
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opted by the governmental institutions. 118 This danger, however, seems
manageable. Since this device might help solve certain network problems, the
rewards clearly outstrip the risks.
It is often observed that the E.U. is a work in progress. The network
system itself continues to invent new mechanisms. Nowhere is that more
evident than in "soft law." 119 One major device, particularly relevant to the
nature of E.U. federalism, is "open method of coordination" (OMC). 120 Under
OMC, the European Council establishes guidelines, or soft law, in a particular
area, and the states are obliged to take the ~uidelines into account in
establishing their domestic policies in those areas.' 1 In doing so, the states are
to cooperate and learn from each other's experiences. 122 The process appears
to have been effective, considering that states are cooperating to develop and
propagate "best practices" based on the guidelines. 123
Assuming that a network character of a national or supranational federal
government is desirable or inevitable, the E.U. experiences provide valuable
lessons. First, it is not enough to formally provide for general public access to
the process. Obstacles, such as cultural diversity and resource disparities, will
inhibit inclusion of all the various interests. If affected citizens do not perceive
a realistic opportunity to influence the formation of regulation, they will not
perceive the implementation as consistent with good government and, perhaps,
the rule of law. Instead, governments may establish devices whereby the
subunits as such are active participants. Specialty representative bodies, such
118
For example, it has been called "a rigged dialogue with society." Charlemagne: A Rigged Dialogue
with Society, ECONOMIST (U.S.), Oct. 23,2004, at 31.
119
Craig and de Burca observe: 'The EC also has numerous soft law methods for developing Community
policy. These include guidelines, policy statements, and declarations by the European Council." CRAIG &
BORCA, supra note 110, at Ill n.ii. But they also reflect: "It may be difficult for those affected to understand
what the 'law' actually is in a particular area. Recourse to informal law may also prevent the Council and
[European Parliament] from having effective input into the content of the resulting norms." /d. at 117.
120 D. COYNE, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, INVOLVING EXPERTS IN THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL POLICY
CONVERGENCE 5 (2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/govemance/areas/group8/report_en.pdf.
121 /d. at 56.
122 For example, notice the "soft law" influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development on member states. James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 219 (2005) (observing that
OECD studies acquire influence: "[t]he net effect can be a subtle but significant form of advocacy"). Hence,
Salzman calls for consideration of proper administrative procedures and safeguards. /d. at 219.
123 This process has been somewhat incorporated throughout the proposed constitution. One example is
Article III-213, which provides in part: "With a view to achieving [social objectives] ... , the Commission
shall encourage cooperation between Member States and facilitate the coordination of their action in all social
policy fields under this Section." Consolidated Treaty, supra note 43, art. III-213. This Article lists seven
social policy fields in particular. See id.
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as the various E.U. committees and nongovernmental public interest
organizations, provide access for various specific categories of citizens as well
as expertise and perspective. More importantly, they give these interests real
influence. The E.U. laboratory in network government has advanced the
understanding of the operation of network government.
B. Evolving Policy Through Implementing Adjudications

Many individual claims and disputes must be decided at the implementing
124
stage, and the devolution of this authority impacts on these adjudications.
Often, these claims and disputes will be resolved at some administrative level
or by other specially designated tribunals, rather than through the general court
systems. The tendency is to view adjudication as primarily a fact-gathering
process for the purpose of the specific application of general policy, generated
by either legislative or delegated authority. However, it is the rare law or
general pronouncement that answers every question at individual application,
or rather, it is the rare individual application that can be clearly determined by
hard law. Thus, at the implementation stage, adjudicators, whether judges or
officials, must tailor the hard law to the case at hand. 125 The aggregate of these
individual decisions forms a potential source of the implementing policy.
Different legal cultures treat this source differently. Indeed, legal cultures can
be distinguished by comparing their treatment of this source. A federal
system, national or supranational, must confront a potential legal culture clash,
both horizontally and vertically. A network federal system faces even more
complicated questions about conduct, equality, and consistency when
implementing adjudications.
Again, the contrast between U.S. federalism and E.U. federalism offers
several insights into the creation of implementing policy in the resolution of
individual rights and duties. Indeed, the E.U. provides a better study vehicle

124
A useful working definition: "Adjudication is a determination of individual rights or duties . . . . In
general, adjudication is the decision making process for applying preexisting standards to individual
circumstances." CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACfiCE 45 (2d ed. 1997) (emphasis
added).
125
Interestingly, Justice Scalia, in Printz, suggested that Congress could require "state administrative
agencies to apply federal law while acting in a judicial capacity" as a state court would. Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898,929 (1997). His somewhat vague suggestion that Congress could assign policymak:ing to
state agencies might support the notion that, even in the U.S., the central government could expect state
administrative adjudicators to participate in the development of federal policy in a given program. See id. at
928 ("Preservation of the States as independent and autonomous political entities is arguably less undermined
by requiring them to make policy in certain fields .... ").
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because it works with various legal cultures. In the U.S., while states vary
somewhat among themselves and within the federal system in their adherence
to hard law, in general, the U.S.'s legal culture is to some extent defined by our
approach to adjudicative policymaking. 126 The E.U., at the very least, must
deal with two major legal cultures: civil law and common law . 127 It has been
necessary for the E.U. to accommodate those legal cultures at the
. I ementmg
. stage. 12s
tmp
Many federal systems no doubt confront even more complex problems
when implementing blending approaches to adjudicative policymaking. Many
federal systems that combine regions or groups that are strongly committed to
varied or even conflicting notions of "judicial" law-making discretion must
find the means to deal with fundamentally diverse approaches to implementing
policymaking in individual disputes. 129 In this regard, the blending of common
law and civil law systems seems a simplistic analytical vehicle. Still, the
realities of accommodating even these two approaches to "judicial"
policymaking are instructive.
1. Case-by-Case Evolution of Implementing Policy

A classic distinction between common law systems and civil law systems
has been the effect of precedent. While the adjudicative process of these two
legal cultures differs significantly, many find a convergence in the use of
precedent. 130 Reminiscent of the common law law development, civil lawyers
refer to precedent, civil law judges recognize prior judicial decisions, and these
judges use those decisions to guide their own decisions. Indeed, in some areas,
such as French tort law, code provisions are so general as to invite judicial
development. 131 Civil law judges are technically free to use precedent as they
see fit, whereas common law judges technically must rely on precedent or
explain their failure to do so.

126

This generalization is confused by the mixed legal system of Louisiana.

VERNON VALENTINE

PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 257 {2001 ).
127

There is probably some variation within these overarching categories.
See supra text accompanying note 4 7.
129
See generally PALMER, supra note 126.
130 See e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A Comparative and
Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation, 65 LA. L. REV. 775, 775 (2005) (finding that
"many jurisdictions, both common law- and civil law-based, are gravitating to 'systemic respect for
jurisprudence' and away from strict use of the traditional stare decisis and jurisprudence constante doctrines").
128

131

JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 355-56 (1998).
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The key theoretical difference is expressed by the term stare decisis.
Theoretically, common law judges are bound by prior cases. Civil law judges
have absolute control in their courtroom and are not bound by the work of their
colleagues. 132 Hence, paradoxically, civil law judges are more powerful in
their own court rooms but weaker in that their opinions have no impact outside
their court. Even appellate court decisions are not binding on the lower courts,
even though the appellate court "reviews" the lower court de novo. The Cour
de Cassation, the private law supreme court, reviews only law, but even then,
that court's legal conclusions are not binding on the lower court. 133 In short,
precedent is not ignored but it does not have a stare decisis effect. 134
In practice, the force of precedent in the U.S. is much weaker than
prescribed by theory. The highest courts seem more than willing to escape
their prior cases. 135 Lower courts often reason around higher court opinions. 136
The U.S. system is more one of dialogue than hierarchy. In addition, precedent
is not held to have binding effect in administrative adjudications. 137
Administrative adjudicative bodies must be consistent, but their decisions do
not have stare decisis effect. Consistency requires that they treat like cases
alike or justify any deviation. 138 At the implementing stage, then, precedent
has an ambiguous force in U.S. adjudications. 139
In both legal cultures, judges use prior judicial decisions and lawyers refer
to precedent; still, the impact of prior opinions varies. Civil law judges often
follow the opinions of their colleagues, and U.S. judges and administrative
adjudicators often stray from the opinions of theirs. The two systems seem to
converge in practice even as to this fundamental distinction. Still, culture
132

ANDREWWESTET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 56 (1998).
Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an American Perspective, 12
B.U. INT'L L.J. 57, 66 (1994) (''The Cour de Cassation is not a court of appeals, but rather a court of
review . . . . The Cour de Cassation blurs the line between advisory opinions and decisions on the merits
through its initial inability to substitute its judgment for that of the cours d'appel or the cours d'assises.").
134
WEST, supra note 132, at 55 ("[Article 5 of the Code Civil] makes it clear that the rule of stare decisis
has no place in French law.").
135
See, e.g., Malia Reddick & Sara C. Benesh, Norm Violation by the Lower Courts in the Treatment of
Supreme Court Precedent: A Research Framework, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 117, 124 (2000) (explaining that "[i]n
[their] study, [they] flou]nd several lower-court rulings thwarting Supreme Court precedent that are ultimately
affirmed as the Court ovenules the offended precedent").
133

136
137

/d.

An administrative agency generally is not bound by the principle of stare decisis. See, e.g., Yellow
Robe v. Bd. of Trs. of S.D. Ret. Sys., 664 N.W.2d 517 (S.D. 2003); Riedmiller v. Harness, 34 P.3d 474 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2001), review denied, (Mar. 20, 2002).
138
330 Concord St. Neighborhood Ass'n v. Campsen, 424 S.E.2d 538 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992).
139
KOCH, supra note 124 § 5.67[4].
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matters. It is impossible to believe that adjudicators raised in the two different
cultures will not approach precedent differently.
A necessary, and perhaps questionable, aspect of the common law system
is the inherent unfairness of holding a litigant to law that was created in the
course of their litigation. Somehow, they are to know not only what the law is
but also what the law will be. U.S. administrative adjudicators have long had
the same authority, so that an agency may find a person in violation of a
standard that was not previously articulated. 140 Although this power parallels
that of common law courts, it has been contested for generations in U.S.
administrative law. Many believe that, unlike courts, U.S. agencies generally
have the power to announce policy through rulemaking and, hence, have no
justification for applying new policy for the first time in an individual
adjudication. U.S. legal culture at present trumps this sense of unfairness.
Nonetheless, the inherent unfairness of this aspect of case-by-case
evolution of policy implementation may irritate those who expect some
faithfulness to existing law from their adjudicators. 141
These cultural
expectations, then, should be confronted as implementing decisions devolve to
subunit adjudicators. From the public's perspective, the expectation of the
various groups of citizens must be identified and dealt with. From the
adjudicators' perspective, some uniform principles must guide their use of,
freedom from, and development of case-derived law. If an adjudicator,
judicial or administrative, in a civil law system is faced with an opinion from a
central adjudicative authority, should that adjudicator treat it the same as one in
a common law system? Should judges sitting in supranational dispute
resolution bodies treat case law according to their legal culture, or should there
be some prescribed or agreed approach to consistency and equal treatment?
Again, network government makes resolution of these potential conflicts both
more difficult and more important.
This choice of case-by-case or unified policymaking is further complicated
by the sensitivities in national federal systems and by the strength of the sense
of sovereignty in supranational bodies. For example, some national courts in
the E.U. system resisted the European Court of Justice's expansion of

140

332

Two classic cases are NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), and SEC v. Chenery Co.,

u.s. 194 (1947).

141 In the context of individual administrative dispute resolutions between a citizen and the government,
the continental doctrine of legitimate expectation might inhibit retrospective administrative policymaking in
individual cases. See JURGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 949-53 ( 1992).
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European law. First, supremacy had to be judicially established in the absence
142
of expressed supremacy.
But that was nowhere near the end. The
judiciaries of different member states submitted at different rates to this
supremacy. 143 Indeed, since continental judiciaries tend to be functionally
divided, different courts systems in the same member state conceded to the
central judiciary differently. Many national courts still claim authority to
decide for themselves whether a matter is within European competence. 144
These are expressions of divided federalism much like the U.S., in which
separate sovereignty is insisted on. 145 The general adjudicative network,
blending national and E.U. judiciaries in the E.U. policymaking process, needs
a judicial dialogue rather than a power struggle.
There seems to be a natural tendency in the formative stages of a society or
in implementing a program to evolve the detail in dispute resolutions. For
example, much of E.U. law has been developed through the decisions of the
E.U. courts. Implementing adjudications in a new supranational organization,
or an emerging national one, can be expected to rely on individual applications
to fill out the general law. Yet again, culture matters. At a subsequent
developmental stage, the legal culture might begin to affect acceptability. In a
network federal structure, the cultural imperatives can be expected to kick in
among the groups at different points and in different degrees. And yet, the
mechanisms for dealing with the cultural expectations are difficult to monitor.
In the E.U., precedent floats around the implementing network, and
adjudicators make of it what they might. To what extent will or should an
official's individual decision in France affect the same E.U. law in England?
Coming to grips with such questions is a challenge for network federalism. In
the end, however, diverse expectations must be satisfied or at least
accommodated.

142

Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964 ECR 1141.
See generally EUROPEAN & NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 64.
144
Even today, several member-state courts have insisted on the power to engage in ultra vires review.
/d. at 95-98.
145
In the U.S., state administrative determinations may control federal authorities. See, e.g., Univ. of
Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986). Even when state determinations do not bind federal authorities,
U.S. folk wisdom is that the states constitute governmental laboratories in which federal policy may form.
See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory .... "). In this way, at least, decisions by state adjudicators affect the evolution of federal policy.
143
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2. Binding Effect of Language

A similar complex cultural clash arises from diverse judicial treatment of
authoritative language as applied in implementing dispute resolution. Again,
the European and U.S. legal cultures are theoretically distinguished by their
approaches to language, and again, the reality is more ambiguous.
Adjudicators in the two systems approach language differently, and it is
predictable that implementing adjudicators will as well. This cultural
difference might provide some insight into authoritative treatment of positive
law in federal systems.
Theoretically, the ordinary European judiciary should be faithful to the
language of statutes. The civil law aspect of this prescription grows out of the
French revolutionary experience, in which the judges abused their power and
are believed to have prevented the developments that might have saved the
country from disaster. 146 Many societies that have adopted the civil law
system have had equally bad experiences with the judiciary and wish to keep
them under the control of the political institutions. They perceive that limits
on the judiciary are a necessary aspect of reform. In short, judicial restraint
and democratic accountability demand that adjudicators honor statutory
language and, perhaps, policy statements issued pursuant to legislatively
delegated authority.
The U.S. has been luckier with its courts and, hence, accepts a good deal of
judicial policymaking. Of course, the common law culture depends on judicial
lawmaking. No U.S. lawyer would challenge the observation of Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks: "The body of decisional law announced by the courts in the
disposition of these [individual] problems tends always to be the initial and
continues to be the underlying body of law governing society." 147 U.S. judges
have acquired considerable freedom from statutory language. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has felt compelled on several occasions to admonish lower
courts to obey "clear language" and not use the device of interpretation to
impose their own policy judgments over that of Congress or its delegates. 148
146

See JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 431 (1968) ('The chief legacy of the [French]
Revolution was not judicial submission to the discipline of the codes but a deep-seated, widely-held conviction
that judges lacked lawmaking power.").
147
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 163-64 (1994).
148
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ("If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def.
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Despite such optmons, U.S. judges engage in "interpretation"-which has
none of the aspects of true interpretation-to interject themselves into
policymaking, and in general, their reach is accepted in U.S. legal culture, if
149
not in other segments of U.S. society.
Thus, we might expect implementing adjudicators from the two systems to
approach authoritative language differently. However, dealing with this
difference as with case-by-case policymaking requires nuance. John Henry
Merryman, in his famous guide to the civil law for U.S. lawyers, captures the
subtlety of the distinction:
The distinction between legislative and judicial production of law can
be misleading. There is probably at least as much legislation in force
in a typical American state as there is in a typical European or Latin
American nation . . . . The authority of legislation [in the U.S.] is
superior to that of judicial decisions; statutes supersede contrary
judicial decisions (constitutional questions aside), but not vice
versa . . . . If, however, one thinks of codification not as a form but
as the expression of an ideology, and if one tries to understand that
ideology and why it achieves expression in code form, then one can
see how it makes sense to talk about codes .... 150
In short, judges in civil law systems feel more constrained by statutory
language than judges in a common law system in which they are expected to
151
"make law."
More to the point, citizens of different cultures, for example

Council, 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978) (noting that the lower courts continued to ignore statutory language after
admonishment from the Supreme Court by stating that "nothing in the [several relevant acts] ... permitted the
court to review and overturn the ... proceeding ... so long as the Commission employed at least the statutory
minima, a matter about which there is no doubt in this case").
149
See Emery G. Lee III, Policy Windows on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 301,318 (2003)
(finding that "judges possess policymaking discretion when a Supreme Court precedent disrupts a settled area
of the law and creates legal ambiguity that must be resolved").
150
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 27-28 (3d ed. 2007).
151
A civil law judge may engage in "teleological" interpretation, the continental equivalent to U.S.
purposive approach. See D. NEIL MAcCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING STATUTES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 511,514,518 (1991). While more activist than many national courts, even E.U. courts
are reluctant to use this device too liberally. HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 10 (6th ed. 2001) (finding that "the Court may lay more emphasis on
some methods than on others. In particular, teleological interpretation, which is rarely used in more traditional
legal systems"). But see L. Neville Brown, The Linguistic Regime of the European Communities: Some
Problems of Law and Language, 15 VAL. U. L. REv. 319, 321 (1981) (The Court of Justice "commonly prefers
a teleological or schematic interpretation of a provision of Community Law; the wording, of course, is not
ignored, but primary importance is not given to 'les termes.' The Court looks rather to '('object, I' esprit, Ia
nature' or 'l'economie' of the text under scrutiny.").
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civil and common law societies, will expect different degrees and perhaps
types of respect for statutory language.
These expectations will be further directed by the political system. Even
English common law judges are compelled to give binding effect to statutory
language. 152 They must honor legislation with more sincerity than U.S.
judges. 153 Citizens of the United Kingdom share the parliamentary tradition
with those on the continent. The separation of the executive and the legislative
in a presidential system empowers the judiciary to act as arbiters between the
two. If they are combined, as in most parliamentary systems, the judiciary is in
conflict with the legislative and executive powers and vulnerable to charges of
usurping functions that are assigned to the political branches in a democracy.
E.U. courts are often found to be more activist than traditional civil law and
parliamentary courts. Partly, this is the result of their French administrative
154
Yet, all but three of the member states are civil law, and all are
court roots.
parliamentary in some sense. If culture matters, it is interesting that the
Council and Parliament have issued "communications" that encourage specific
rather than general code. 155 Perhaps this development merely manifests a
cultural instinct for codes. As would be predicted if that were the case, the
United Kingdom is a strong dissenter to the concept of a European code. 156
However, it is not farfetched to suggest that the code movement, as it happened
in many civil law countries, is the result of a cultural aversion to freewheeling
judicial policymaking. Not only have the E.U. courts assumed a dominant role
in shaping European law, but their activism has encouraged national courts to
Judicial activism may, at least
ignore traditional judicial restraint. 157
subconsciously, offend European expectations. It would then be predicted that
traditional and, perhaps, new devices will emerge to reassert democratic

152 See WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 29 ( 1994) (''The sovereignty of
Parliament ... exerts a constant and powerful influence. [l]t is an ever-present threat to the position of the
courts . . . inclin[ing] the judges towards caution in their attitude to the executive, since Parliament is
effectively under the executive's control.")
153 See id.
154 See, e.g., ANDREW WEST ET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 54 (1998) ("In Administrative law,
however, fewer of the rules of substantive law are found in legislative texts, and the role of the judges has
therefore, of necessity, been more creative.").
155 Mel Kenny, Constructing a European Civil Code: Quis Custodietlpsos Custodes?, 12 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 775' 787-94 (2006).
156 See id. at 792 ("[T]he common law reactions were the least enthusiastic.").
157 See WALTER VAN GERVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POLITY OF STATES AND PEOPLES 113-18 (2005)
(observing and supporting this development).
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accountability. Regardless, implementing adjudicators will not be in position
to challenge traditions without repercussions.
True judicial interpretation implements democratic policymaking; in
contrast, independent judicial policymaking subverts it. Cultures that are
unaccustomed to, or even wary of, cavalier judicial treatment of democratic
action can be expected to see danger. The more autonomous the dispute
resolution body, the more vulnerable it is to claims of lawlessness and
trenching on individual rights. In the context of individual adjudications,
faithfulness to both legislative and regulatory language is fundamental to
democratic accountability-both real and perceived. The concept of the rule
of law demands that officials, more than judges, be constrained by positive
law. At the application stage, people directly affected are likely to resent
assertion of common-law-type license by their implementing adjudicators.
The confusion of authority inherent in network implementation confuses
accountability and can be expected to increase uneasiness. The network needs
to develop mechanisms for controlling its adjudicators and, at the same time,
protect its adjudicators from influence. The very stability of such systems
requires that citizens see that justice is done at the implementation level.
IV.

OVERVIEW

Federalism in general is a challenge. While the concept envisions a jointly
beneficial government, the sense of joint enterprise deteriorates as generalized
policy moves down to individual citizens. Ideally, the constituent parts of a
federal regime should reach some agreement on the development of
implementing policymaking. But a government that mixes social, political,
and legal cultures is especially challenged in meeting expectations about fair
decisions and decisionmaking at the individual-citizen level. Large-scale
failure to meet popular expectations as to fairness and legitimacy among its
citizens will ultimately undermine a federal system. While structured diversity
seems to be the answer, diversity also presents the danger of unequal and
inconsistent treatment.
These challenges are magnified in network federalism. A hierarchical
regime can build a common understanding of fairness and justice, and a
divided regime allows each subunit to find its own norms that are consistent
with the expectation of its citizens. The concept of network government
attempts to legitimize a somewhat chaotic policymaking processes, but this
chaos is its weakness as well as its strength. Unless a network government can

2007]

POLICYMAKING IN NETWORK GOVERNMENTS

199

engender a sense of justice and legitimacy as policy is applied to its citizens, it
will be unstable. This may be the gravest challenge for network federalism.

